In this paper we analyze the development of interactive TV in the U.S. and Western Europe. We argue that despite the nascent character of the market there are important regulatory issues at stake, as exemplified by the AOL/TW merger and the British Interactive Broadcasting case. Absent rules that provide for non-discriminatory access to network components (including terminal equipment specifications), dominant platform operators are likely to leverage ownership of delivery infrastructure into market power over interactive TV services. While integration between platform operator, service provider and terminal vendor may facilitate the introduction of services in the short-term, the lasting result will be a collection of fragmented "walled gardens" offering limited content and applications. Would interactive TV develop under such model, the exciting
In this paper we analyze the development of interactive TV in the U.S. and Western Europe and the policy debates that have accompanied it. We argue that despite the nascent character of the market there are important regulatory issues at stake that will determine the future architecture of this information distribution platform. Absent rules that provide for non-discriminatory access to network components and a degree of standardization for terminal equipment, dominant platform operators are likely to leverage ownership of delivery infrastructure into market power over interactive TV services. While in the short-term integration between platform operator, service provider and terminal vendor is likely to facilitate the introduction of services, the lasting result will be a collection of fragmented "walled gardens" offering limited content and applications. Would interactive TV develop under such model, the exciting opportunities for broad-based innovation and extended access to multiple information, entertainment and educational services may be foregone.
We recognize that given the incipient nature of the market (particularly in the U.S.), it would be premature for regulators to attempt to implement detailed industry-wide rules for interactive TV platforms and services. There is simply too much uncertainty about which services users will want (and at what price), how the technology will evolve, and what business models will emerge. It may be that the dynamics of market competition will stimulate a migration from proprietary technologies and "walled garden" business models to open standards and interconnected networks (much like what happened in the narrow-band ISP industry during the 1990's), thus making regulatory safeguards less necessary. We nonetheless content that it is not too early to establish general rules and first principles with which to monitor market developments. Interactive TV provides another test case of how to adapt existing broadcasting and telecommunications regulation to the ongoing convergence of digital networks in a way that balances industry development with the economic and social benefits associated with open network access.
The debate over broadband cable Internet offered a first approach to the problem and some important lessons.
1 While technologies may vary from case to case, our ultimate policy goals should not.
The case of interactive TV thus offers an opportunity to investigate how desirable policy goals, among them competition, broad-based innovation, and widespread access to information "from diverse and antagonistic sources", 2 should be implemented in the postconvergence environment. We start the paper by reviewing the evolution of the broadcasting industry through three successive models: the "Fordist" TV model, the multichannel TV model, and the emerging interactive TV model. Second, we characterize the basic components of interactive TV and explore the concerns raised by the evolution of multichannel video programming distributors (MVPDs) into interactive TV platform operators. Our conclusion is that dominant MVPDs are likely to have the ability and the incentive to leverage control over the transmission platform into the ITV applications environment, engineering market outcomes in favor of affiliated programmers, electronic retailers, and ITV service providers. We note that unlike the case of broadband cable
Internet the concerns go beyond infrastructure access control and include the use of proprietary terminal equipment standards.
Third, we review how regulators in the U.S. and the European Union (EU) have so far responded to these concerns by contrasting two cases: the AOL/Time Warner merger and British Interactive Broadcasting case. We conclude that the wait-and-see approach taken
by American regulators risks tolerating the deployment of a closed architecture network that would inhibit healthy competition in interactive TV services, hamper innovation, and create a large group of second-class digital economy citizens with access to a very limited array of entertainment, transaction, and educational services. We also note that the 1 See Bar et al. (2000) . 2 Associated Press v. Unites States, 326 U.S. 1, p. 20 (1945) .
imposition of limited open access requirements in the UK market has hardly hampered investments in interactive TV. Finally, we outline a general framework for regulatory thinking about open network access that reflects the convergence of communications industry sectors and the need to balance seemingly conflicting policy goals.
The three generations of broadcasting
The half-century old broadcasting industry has developed through three technological generations, each characterized by different types of services, business models, control strategies, and regulatory environment (Table 1) . It is interesting to note that each new generation has not thoroughly overhauled the pre-existing industry structure, but rather added a layer of complexity to it. From the start of commercial broadcasting in the postwar period to about the mid-1970's, television consisted essentially of one-way terrestrial broadcasting of a limited number of channels which aggregated and sold large audiences to advertisers, the operators of which were protected by rules that restricted competition both within the industry and from new entrants (Horwitz, 1989; Hazlett, 1998 ). The regulatory model was based on the idea that broadcasters (both public and private) are trustees of a public resource (the radio spectrum) and thus under obligation to serve the public interest as defined by the government. While government protection from competition ensured the profitability of most broadcasting operations, fulfillment of public interest obligations was, at best, questionable.
During the 1970's, a series of technological and regulatory developments created the conditions for the rapid growth of cable, and later direct-to-home satellite TV (DBS).
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These new platforms essentially offered more (and today, much more) of the same service: one-way delivery of branded packages of TV programming. However, a new business model emerged based on the collection of payments directly from subscribers, spawning the growth of specialized channels with limited audience base. In the case of program-related services the programmer or advertiser will typically contract with an interactive TV service provider for the creation of programming enhancements, storage of interactive content, and management of return channel data.
Nevertheless, the compliance of the network operator is still needed to deliver the downstream program enhancements, to allow compatibility between interactive TV applications and operator-provided customer equipment (unless a stand-alone box is used, which is unlikely for reasons discussed below), and possibly to provide the highspeed return path needed for certain applications. Therefore, the ability of programmers and interactive TV service providers to experiment with and deploy services is de facto dependent on access to both the transmission infrastructure and the home terminal functions. As we argue in the next section, unless regulatory safeguards guarantee such access on non-discriminatory terms, the next generation of broadcasting services will (like the previous generations) be characterized by slow innovation and limited competition.
While the market for interactive TV is still maturing, the pace of development has accelerated dramatically in recent years. Growth has been fueled by decreasing equipment costs (of both network hardware and home terminals) 13 and related infrastructure investments that facilitate the provision of interactive TV services, in particular the slow but steady migration to digital transmission standards in terrestrial, cable, and satellite TV. 14 Analysts estimate that in Britain 25% of households will use 13 For example, the cost of video servers, the core component of video-on-demand systems, has dropped 90% over the last years (see "Interactive Television: Fulfilling the Promise," Broadcasting & Cable, July 10, 2000, p.22). The cost of digital set-top boxes has also dropped dramatically in recent years following the decline in prices for computer components. 14 For a discussion of the transition to digital TV see Galperin (forthcoming 
Policy concerns raised by interactive TV
Different opportunities for dominant network operators to foreclose competition in the adjacent markets for interactive TV and video programming services exist at different network layers. In this section we examine the opportunities and incentives for anticompetitive behavior that result from vertical integration between network operators and interactive TV service provider at three network layers: the transmission system, the return path, and the home terminal (typically a digital set-top box). We argue that switching costs, network complementarities, first-mover advantages and technical advantages are likely to create a dominant platform for the delivery of ITV services in every geographic market (in most cases the monopoly cable franchisee) for which there will be no close substitutes. As a result, unaffiliated interactive TV service providers and programmers may face discriminatory access to the transmission infrastructure necessary to compete in the third generation of broadcasting. This risk will likely dampen innovation and discourage entry by third-party application developers and programmers into the interactive TV market.
15 Source: Jupiter Media Matrix. 16 The British government has already stated its goal that following the digital switchover every home with a TV-set and a telephone line has access to the Internet. It is important to note that in the case of program-related services, the issue is not of programmers' access rights to cable distribution per se. Even when the network operator has agreed (or is forced by statute, as in the case of local TV stations) to carry an unaffiliated programmer, it has the ability to favor its own related programmer (e.g., AOL/TW's Cartoon Network vs. Disney's Disney Channel) by stripping out the interactive features of a rival's video signal (e.g., the ATVEF triggers). Alternatively, the platform operator can slow down the rate of transmission of the downstream interactive data, thus interfering with the synchronization between the interactive service and the programming to which it is related. The ultimate effect is similar: to make an unaffiliated video signal less compelling as an information/entertainment experience.
In the case of dedicated interactive TV services, the bundling of transmission and interactive TV services presents question similar to those discussed in the context of the debate over broadband cable Internet. Nonetheless, the concerns are exacerbated by the fact that, unlike ISPs, interactive TV service providers face from the start the closed network architecture of the second generation of broadcasting, rather than the open, end-to-end architecture of the first-generation Internet. If a single transmission platform emerges as the only viable alternatively to compete in the provision of interactive TV services (an assumption we explore below), the platform operator does not need to reengineer the network in order to favor its affiliates because entry will be, from the outset, by invitation only. As the ITC explains, "The distinctiveness of interactive television services as compared with the Internet is manifested in the "walled garden" concept, where a limited number of sites or parts of sites are selected by the interactive licensee (…). In this environment an interactive licensee has the potential to exercise a degree of pre-selection and control of content through their contractual relationships with the providers of the walled garden content. This factor (…) suggest that a somewhat different treatment is needed than applied to the Internet" (ITC, 2000, p. 7).
Critics of ex-ante regulatory action on interactive TV nonetheless contend that network operators are unlikely to have incentives to discriminate against unaffiliated interactive TV providers or programmers, and thus any rules imposed will have costly effects on investments and service efficiency. As Elhauge argues, "it is implausible that any local ITV platform could hope to raise entry barriers by denying access to rival ITV service providers. Because it could not raise entry barriers, it would have incentives to deny access if and only if such a denial were efficient: either because the denied provider would not efficiently fit the platform or because vertical integration of ITV platforms and services is more efficient. Any interference with such decisions would make ITV markets inefficient, with higher costs or lower quality for consumers" (Elhauge, 2001, p. 35 ).
In our opinion, the argument that vertically-integrated network operators will lack incentives to discriminate, and hence will offer access to as many programmers and service providers as would "fit the platform," is unconvincing. While it is clear that a network operator will want to maximize available content in order to attract subscribers, it is not clear that it will have incentives to grant users access to competing interactive TV service providers, particularly given the existence of close substitutes in the content 25 The network operator may also degrade the quality of the return path (in terms of speed or reliability) offered to third parties. In addition, it could seek charges for t-commerce transactions originated through its platform. This would be similar to an ISP seeking compensation from electronic retailers such as Amazon.com for every item sold to its subscribers. Rather than simply enabling transactions under the end-to-end principle, the transport operator would erect a tollgate between buyers and sellers. 26 Lastly, valuable customer data can be obtained from the return path even when the platform operator is not a party of the commercial transaction taking place. This has raised concerns not only from third-party programmers and interactive TV service providers but also from consumer groups concerned about viewers having little control over how the return-path data will be compiled and used.
c) Home terminal
The third necessary component of an interactive TV system is the home terminal or digital set-top box. As the number and complexity of interactive TV services increases, so will the processing and storage capacity of the home terminal in order to perform the different tasks. In essence, a digital set-top box is similar to a stripped-down PC. In order to enter the market an interactive TV service provider (assuming it has secured both downstream and upstream carriage) faces two options: it can either contract with the dominant platform operator to gain access to the installed base of terminals, or it can deploy a stand-alone box, thus bypassing the proprietary terminal components altogether.
The latter option, while theoretically possible, is nonetheless uneconomical for most potential entrants. It is highly unlikely that users will be willing to buy a new box for every new interactive TV application (who would be willing to buy a separate PC for every new application?). While this doctrine is yet to be applied in a case regarding interactive TV, the language of the new regulatory framework proposed by the European Commission (EC) reveals the intent to extend existing access obligations to the set-top box components controlled by dominant cable and satellite TV operators.
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The second component that raises policy concerns is the Electronic Programming Guide (EPG), a navigation software that allows users to browse and select TV channels and services. With the manifold increase in the number of channels and applications made possible by the transition to digital TV, the EPG is expected to become to the broadcasting industry what Web portals have become to the Internet: powerful tools to direct traffic and obtain advertising revenues (Mansell, 1999) . From a regulatory standpoint, the main concern is that dominant platform operators do not use the EPG to leverage their power onto the market for video programming and interactive TV services. "Issues of ensuring listing of third-party services or programming, and the quality of such listings, will be of critical importance. Exclusive arrangements tying particular EPGs to particular service bundles may become a problem requiring regulatory intervention to ensure third-party access on fair, transparent and non-discriminatory terms" (EC, 1997, p. 24).
U.S. policymakers have grown increasingly concerned about issues of first-screen and presentation bias, although regulatory action has so far been limited. 33 However, with the merger of the two major EPG providers (Gemstar and TV Guide) in 1999, the issue has come under scrutiny from the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice (DOJ).
While the DOJ approved the merger without conditions, it is now investigating Gemstar-TV Guide for abuse of its control over critical patents for EPG services. 34 In Europe, by contrast, regulators have taken a more active role in regulating EPG services, either to protect third-party programmers and service providers or to favor publicly-funded broadcasters. In the UK, for example, OFTEL has interpreted EPGs as covered by the non-discriminatory rules for telecommunications access services, 35 while the ITC has adopted a "code of conduct" for EPG providers that, among other things, mandates that the visual interface grants public service channels "due prominence." 36 As discussed below in the BiB case, European competition authorities have also acted against exclusivity arrangements between EPG providers and dominant platform operators.
The cases: The AOL/TW merger and British Interactive Broadcasting
The debate about the proper tools and scope of regulatory action vis-à-vis interactive TV While regulators raised few concerns about this service, AOL's plan to upgrade it by embedding AOLTV within cable boxes and utilizing the broadband Internet platform of the cable operator did trouble competition authorities. As the FTC explains, "AOL recently launched AOL TV, a first generation ITV service, and is well positioned to become the leading ITV provider. Local cable companies will play the key role in enabling the delivery of ITV services. After the merger, AOL Time Warner will have incentives to prevent or deter rival ITV providers from competing with AOL's ITV service. Thus the merger could enable AOL to exercise unilateral market power for ITV services in Time Warner cable areas, which also affects the ability of ITV providers to compete nationally"
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Despite the strong wording of these findings, the FTC ultimately imposed rather weak remedies concerning interactive TV. The consent decree simply prohibits AOL-Time
Warner from interfering with its subscribers' ability to use the interactive signals or "triggers" provided by programmers that it has agreed (or is forced by statute) to carry.
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In essence, the FTC order only addressed one of the possible anti-competitive strategies discussed above, that of network operators "stripping" the signals of unaffiliated programmers from its interactive content. Other discriminatory practices related to downstream transmission, upstream transmission (the return path) and the home terminal were left unaddressed.
The FCC concurred with the findings of the FTC merger review vis-à-vis interactive TV:
"AOL Time Warner would have the potential ability to use its combined control of cable system facilities, video programming and the AOLTV service to discriminate against unaffiliated video programming networks in the provision of ITV services in the provision of ITV services. We also find that AOL Time Warner may have incentives to engage in such discriminatory behavior."
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The FCC analysis is broader in scope and acknowledges that the anti-competitive strategies available to AOL/TW go beyond the "stripping" of interactive content of unaffiliated programmers. One of the conditions imposed concerned the recovery of the home terminal subsidy. The
Commission forced BiB to establish a separate company to manage the subsidy payments in order to ensure that the recovery is evenly distributed among service operators and broadcasters, whether affiliated with BiB and its partners or not. It also demanded that the subsidy was not linked to a subscription to BSkyB's pay-TV service. Another condition related to the terms of access to the home terminal components. BiB agreed to provide, upon request, the API specifications and other proprietary technical systems to third parties. The Commission also forced BiB to end its exclusivity agreement with BSkyB whereby BiB would be the only available interactive TV service on BSkyB's EPG. In addition, the Commission also imposed several obligations on the joint venture partners.
BSkyB agreed to offer access services to programmers and interactive TV service providers (including BiB) on fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory terms regulated by OFTEL under the access control class license. 48 It also agreed to supply, upon request, a "clean feed" (i.e., stripped of interactive applications) of its film and sports channels to 45 McCallum (1999), p. 13. 46 In the case of BSkyB, it leases satellite capacity from SES (Société Européenne des Satellites). 47 For a discussion of these advantages see Cave (1997 developments have simply proved these arguments unfounded. With Britain leading the world in the deployment of interactive TV, 53 it is clear that the condition imposed have hardly discouraged investment in this maturing market.
Conclusion
In the aftermath of the AOL/TW merger the debate about open cable access seems to have faded. However, the more general problem of nondiscriminatory access to the basic layers of communications infrastructure (whether cable lines, the local loop, or the digital TV user terminal) is arguably the crucial issue for industry and regulators in the postconvergence era. In this paper we have examined how this problem has re-emerged with the migration to the third generation of broadcasting technology, that of interactive TV.
We argued that absent regulatory safeguards that provide for non-discriminatory access to several network components (including digital set-top box components), dominant network operators are likely to leverage ownership of delivery infrastructure into market power over interactive TV services, foreclosing competition and discouraging third parties and users from experimenting with unimagined ways to use television.
In the case of interactive TV, the question of open access is not about extending existing regulatory principles to the new generation of technologies (as it is for the case of broadband Internet). Rather, it is about seizing the opportunities offered by these new technologies to better serve our policy goals. Broadcasting regulation has traditionally taken distribution scarcities and closed network architecture as a fact of life dictated by the available technology, thus relying on ownership rules, licensing criteria, must-carry rules and other regulatory instruments to attain its goals. 54 It is now widely acknowledged that this approach has not only largely failed on its own merits but that it is inadequate for the post-convergence era. 55 The third generation of broadcasting calls for shifting the focus of regulatory action from government "tinkering with the configuration of a mass 53 See "Those interactive Britons are tuning on their tellies," The New York Times, April 18, 2001. 54 See among many others Pool (1983) and Mulgan (1991) . 55 For a U.S. critique see Hazlett and Spitzer (2000) . For a European critique see Hoffmann-Riem (1996) . media market" 56 to rules that ensure nondiscriminatory access to the capacity to experiment with and provide information, entertainment, and transaction services over broadcasting networks.
American regulators have so far imposed rather toothless safeguards to prevent discriminatory behavior by incumbent network operators in the interactive TV market.
Furthermore, these rules are dispersed across statutes addressing different platforms, thus adversely affecting market competition. European authorities, by contrast, are in the process of fashioning a comprehensive framework that addresses problems of access and interconnection across electronic communications networks. 57 This framework does not impose specific remedies but rather lays out general principles to tackle problems as they arise. By addressing access in a piecemeal, ad-hoc fashion, U.S. policymakers threaten to undermine the very basis of the unprecedented innovation in telecommunications and information services of the last decade and forego the possibility to overhaul an antiquated broadcasting regulatory regime. 56 Benkler (2000), p. 562. 57 See Amended proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on access to, and interconnection of, electronic communications networks and associated facilities. COM(2001) 369 final.
